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 The National Socialists’ primary foreign policy objective after taking office was to rearm Germany so that it might reverse the verdict of the First World 
War and acquire the “living space” necessary to becoming a world power on par 
with Britain or the United States� For the German armed services, the Third 
Reich’s ambitious plans meant that they were 
compelled to broaden their missions and opera-
tional capabilities� For its part, the German navy 
expanded between 1933 and 1939 from a coastal-
defense force to one capable of deploying a fleet to 
challenge the Royal Navy for command of the seas� 
But this would be impossible without sufficient 
raw materials, most importantly petroleum to fuel 
The German Navy’s Independent Energy Security Strategy,  
1932–1940
Anand Toprani
[The] Naval High Command has from the very beginning operated from 
the conviction—especially in view of the lessons Italy had to learn dur-
ing the Abyssinian War—that in any military conflict, particularly one 
in which England is in any way involved, economic warfare will play a 
considerable role alongside military operations. In view of the fact that 
England has at its disposal connections around the world, it is only pos-
sible for the navy to secure oil supplies from overseas through long and 
exhaustive preparation.
ADMIRAL ERICH RAEDER TO ECONOMICS MINISTER WALTHER FUNK, 6 MAY 1940
[You claim] that only the Naval High Command has failed to show any 
appreciation for your efforts with regard to petroleum supplies. This is 
correct. The Naval High Command recognized from the start that, by 
pursuing a wartime petroleum supply policy under the influence of the 
major oil companies, your department was following a path that must 
eventually lead to calamity.
RAEDER TO FUNK, 27 JUNE 1940
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the navy’s surface ships and submarines� As an oil-poor nation vulnerable to 
blockade and short of foreign exchange to pay for imports, Germany had to make 
hard choices about how to allocate its limited supplies of petroleum—not just 
between the military and civilian consumers but also among the armed services� 
Since the Third Reich required continental hegemony before it could aspire 
to global supremacy, German leaders devoted their limited economic resources 
to satisfying the petroleum requirements of their army and air force (gasoline 
and aviation fuel) before those of the navy (fuel oil and diesel fuel)� The Ger-
man navy resented its subordinate status and—as befits a budding maritime 
force with global aspirations—pursued an independent energy-security strategy 
that featured acquiring in Iraq and Mexico oil concessions that would allow it to 
stockpile large quantities of petroleum in peacetime� But the navy’s long-term oil 
ambitions—and bureaucratic manipulations—conflicted with the overall energy-
security strategy of the Third Reich, which was focused on the short-term goal of 
fueling a land and air struggle for the mastery of Europe� Although Adolf Hitler 
expected the navy to play a much larger role in achieving German objectives 
than even the naval leadership initially expected, other agencies with competing 
ideas about how to guarantee Germany’s energy security joined forces to quash 
the navy’s plans in Iraq and Mexico in 1936 and 1938 before they did irreparable 
damage to Germany’s relations with the major U�S� and British oil companies, 
which were the Third Reich’s most important foreign suppliers of oil prior to the 
outbreak of the Second World War� 
THE PROBLEM OF NAVAL FUEL SUPPLIES IN THE THIRD REICH
In the years between the National Socialist “seizure of power” in 1933 and the 
outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the Third Reich made impressive 
strides in increasing Germany’s supply of petroleum (see table 1)� The center-
piece of Germany’s energy-security strategy to increase domestic production 
of petroleum was the development of a synthetic-fuel industry� Since before the 
First World War German scientists had been perfecting methods of synthesizing 
various petroleum products from coal—first the Bergius process (1913), which 
yielded gasoline, then the Fischer-Tropsch process (1926), which could produce 
heavier fuels, such as diesel, but was more expensive than the Bergius process� 
The National Socialists did not stop at synthetic fuel; they embraced what we 
would today call an “all of the above” approach, including incentivizing domestic 
crude-oil production and curtailing civilian consumption (0�312 barrels of gaso-
line per capita in Germany, compared with 0�98 in Great Britain and 3�99 in the 
United States by 1938)�1 
Nevertheless, total consumption within Germany still rose as the economy 
recovered from the Great Depression, and although domestic synthetic- and 
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crude-oil production 
managed to keep pace, 
the share of imports 
within Germany’s over-
all supply of petroleum 
did  not  decl ine  (70 
percent by 1938). Nor, 
for that matter, were the 
armed services able to 
make significant prog-
ress in accumulating 
stockpiles, even though 
they knew full well from 
their experience during 
the Great War that they 
could not expect to im-
port much from over-
seas in the event of a British blockade.2
The most pressing challenge was, however, the cost of importing petroleum 
to meet rising domestic consumption—from 2,478,000 tons in 1932 to 5,165,000 
tons in 1939. Importing large quantities of petroleum in peacetime was not a 
straightforward matter, since the U.S. and British oil companies that dominated 
the global oil industry demanded at least partial repayment in hard currency.3 As 
a result, German expenditures of foreign exchange for petroleum imports almost 
doubled during the first half of the Third Reich, from 129,800,000 Reichsmarks 
(RM) in 1933 to 230,000,000 RM in 1939.4 Under normal circumstances this 
would not pose an insurmountable challenge, since a modern industrial nation 
can simply boost its exports to balance its current account. Germany was not, 
however, operating under normal economic conditions after the National So-
cialists took power. The Great Depression and the collapse in global trade had 
wiped out most of Germany’s foreign-exchange reserves before 1933, after which 
rearmament soaked up German industrial and domestic raw materials (e.g., coal) 
production, leaving only small quantities available for export. The need to import 
food and strategic raw materials and to service the German foreign debt, as well 
as fears of unleashing inflation, convinced Hitler and Hjalmar Schacht (then 
president of the Reichsbank and later minister of economics) to reject the path 
taken by Britain and the United States and devalue the Reichsmark.5 This meant 
that German exports were overvalued by as much as 40 percent compared with 
those priced in dollars or sterling.6 Although this eased Germany’s import bill, 
reduced exports meant lower earnings of foreign exchange, which (along with the 
Year Crude Oil Refined Petroleum  
(natural & synthetic)
Imports
1933 230  291 2,685
1934 318  N/A 3,155
1935 427  N/A 3,826
1936 445  N/A 4,229
1937 453  620 4,313
Synthetic Fuel Only
1938 552 1,600 4,957
1939 888 2,200 5,165
TABLE 1
GERMANY’S PETROLEUM SUPPLY, 1933–1939  
(THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS)
Note: Crude oil statistics for 1938–39 includes Austrian output. Figures drawn from Reichs-Kredit- 
Gesellschaft AG, “Treibstoffwirtschaft in der Welt und in Deutschland”; and USSBS, Effects of Strategic Bomb-
ing on the German War Economy, p. 75.
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overall rise in commodity prices as the global economy recovered from the Great 
Depression) impaired the Third Reich’s ability to cover the gap between its con-
sumption and production of most key strategic raw materials through imports�7 
Even Romania, which became Germany’s most important source of oil after 
1939 and later joined the Axis, was not a reliable supplier� Production there 
peaked in 1936 at 8,700,000 tons—good for fourth place among world oil pro-
ducers but only 5 percent of the output of the United States� Six of the seven larg-
est oil companies in Romania before the war, accounting for roughly 80 percent 
of that nation’s production, were owned by American, British, Dutch, French, 
and Belgian oil companies or banks, while Romanian, Italian, and German firms 
controlled the remaining production� The Romanian government meanwhile 
received royalties from the foreign oil companies in the form of crude oil (11–12 
percent of total production)� The major obstacle from Germany’s perspective was 
that it could not import oil at will� Starting in 1935, Bucharest limited the amount 
of oil it exported to Germany that could be paid for through clearing agreements 
(see below) to 25 percent of the total value of all exports�8 
During the Third Reich, Germany used a variety of methods to finance inter-
national trade, including “clearing agreements,” “barter agreements,” and pay-
ment in “blocked currency�” Clearing agreements are basically pools of money 
into which a nation’s exporters deposit the hard-currency proceeds of their sales; 
importers thereafter draw from these pools to finance their purchases� Barter 
agreements are transactions denominated in finished or unfinished goods� Fi-
nally, the Reich created “blocked currency” known as “Askimarks” (a German 
portmanteau word for Foreigners’ Special Accounts for Domestic Payment) to 
finance trade with Latin America� These “Askimarks” were nonconvertible and 
could only be used to purchase specified German goods�9 In all three instances, 
the guiding principle was to keep the amount of money that changed hands to a 
minimum� This included both foreign exchange (e�g�, dollars and sterling) and 
the Reichsmark, whose value would drop if foreigners exchanged it for other cur-
rencies� The Third Reich was happy to allow foreign firms to accumulate their 
earnings within Germany, provided that they did not repatriate them� This was 
of course unacceptable to the U�S� and British oil companies, which had to remit 
at least some of their earnings back home�10 
One method of meeting Germany’s oil requirements at minimal cost to the 
country’s dwindling reserves of foreign exchange was importing crude oil directly 
from Iraq through the British Oil Development Company (BOD), a multination-
al combine that won the oil concession for all of Iraq west of the Tigris River in 
1932� Even though supplies from Iraq would be unavailable in the event of a Brit-
ish blockade, many German officials—especially the navy leadership—hoped the 
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BOD would facilitate the stockpiling of oil in peacetime and reduce Germany’s 
dependence on the U�S� and British major oil companies�11 Another alternative 
was to take advantage of Mexico’s nationalization of its oil industry in 1938 to 
purchase the now-discounted Mexican oil with minimal expenditure of foreign 
exchange�12 The story of German participation in the BOD and of subsequent 
efforts in Mexico therefore offers a valuable perspective on the role of one rela-
tively autonomous agency—the German navy—in defining and implementing an 
independent energy-security strategy within the framework of Germany’s overall 
preparations to wage another world war�13 
German naval policy during the early years of the Third Reich was relatively mod-
est in scope and objectives� Building on the lessons of the First World War, Admi-
ral Erich Raeder (commander in chief of the German navy) ruled out building a 
fleet capable of challenging the Royal Navy, preferring a smaller fleet composed 
of “pocket battleships,” cruisers, aircraft carriers, and submarines� Moreover, he 
considered France, rather than Britain, both the quantitative benchmark and the 
expected opponent�14 Consequently, when it came to petroleum requirements the 
navy was a minor player by comparison with its sister services�15 In 1935, a year 
before Germany embraced a policy of self-sufficiency in petroleum through the 
Four-Year Plan (mainly by boosting production of synthetic fuel), the German 
navy imported roughly 75 percent of its requirements�16 The following year, the 
Naval High Command projected its annual wartime needs as of 1939 at only 
1,400,000 tons of fuel oil and 400,000 tons of diesel fuel, all of which it expected 
would be supplied from domestic production and reserves�17 By 1938, however, 
as the process of rearmament gathered steam, the German navy was estimating 
it would require as much as 4,500,000 tons of fuel oil per year in wartime� Since 
domestic production of fuel oil was well behind expectations (only 130,000 tons 
per annum), the navy had no option but to import most of its requirements�18 
The navy’s requirements continued to balloon as Germany’s aggressive for-
eign policy increased the probability of a great-power conflict� Starting in 1933, 
Raeder had sought to manipulate Hitler into granting the navy a larger slice of 
the resource pie by framing the desired naval construction program in terms de-
signed to appeal to Hitler’s stated policy preferences� Hitler had, since his earliest 
days in politics and explicitly in Mein Kampf and his unpublished “Second Book,” 
spoken in favor of an alliance with Britain and Italy directed against France, then 
the Soviet Union, and finally the United States� Following Hitler’s cues, rather 
than demanding a fleet equal to that of the Royal Navy the navy asked for one 
equal to that of France, which it hoped would enhance Germany’s value as an ally 
to Britain (i�e�, in accord with Hitler’s grand strategy)�19 
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Raeder, then, was caught flat-footed when Hitler abruptly abandoned his ef-
forts to woo Britain and instead sought to use the German navy as a deterrent 
against it� As relations with Britain deteriorated in the wake of the Anschluss with 
Austria and the onset of the Sudeten crisis in the summer of 1938, Hitler pushed 
the navy to adopt more and more expansive construction programs� Raeder still 
preferred a balanced fleet designed to wage a guerre de course against Britain, but 
Hitler overruled him and demanded additional capital ships� This process cul-
minated in the “Z-Plan” of January 1939, which envisaged the creation by 1946 
of a fleet of superbattleships capable of challenging the Royal Navy for maritime 
dominance�20 As a result of the Z-Plan the navy’s annual requirements of fuel 
oil and diesel fuel in wartime would skyrocket to eight million tons by 1947–48, 
whereas the entire German domestic production of all petroleum products 
in 1938 totaled a mere 6,150,000 tons� Even assuming sufficient oil could be 
found—which was unlikely, since the air force had also received permission to 
quintuple its frontline and reserve strength—the navy would need to construct 
ten million tons of fuel-storage capacity at a time when there was insufficient 
coal, iron, or steel available to meet existing armaments or economic programs 
(including the expansion of synthetic-fuel production)�21
As early as 1937, in fact, the navy had begun to express doubts about whether 
Germany would soon be self-sufficient in petroleum and to worry that domes-
tic production of fuel oil and diesel was lagging behind that of the gasoline and 
Raeder (second from left), General Werner von Blomberg (minister of war; third from left), and Hitler on board the battleship Deutschland in April 1934
Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1987-0703-514 / CC-BY-SA
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aviation fuel critical for combined-arms operations on land (i�e�, supplies for the 
army and air force)�22 The fact that the man responsible for Germany’s economic 
mobilization, Hermann Göring, was also commander in chief of the air force and 
privileged the expansion of synthetic gasoline production (including aviation 
fuel) over that of fuel oil and diesel fuel did not go unnoticed within the navy�23 
Although Germany had poured resources into its burgeoning synthetic-fuel 
industry, future production would, according to one naval assessment, likely 
only suffice “to absorb” increases in military and civilian consumption� The navy 
therefore could not afford to be cut off from the international oil market� Rather 
than chase “oil autarky” in Europe, the navy’s position by 1938 was that it ought 
“to maintain and forcefully expand connections with foreign oil companies�”24 
By September 1939 imported oil accounted for roughly a quarter of the Ger-
man navy’s diesel supply and a third of its fuel oil supply� For the year as a whole, 
228,105 tons of fuel and 125,042 tons of diesel fuel came from overseas�25 The 
navy considered this inadequate and wished to accumulate a reserve equivalent 
to at least a year’s consumption, after which time anticipated higher domestic 
production could pick up the slack� There was no shortage of oil on the inter-
national market; the problem, rather, was financial, since Germany lacked the 
foreign exchange to pay for imports of sufficient quantities of petroleum from the 
major U�S� and British oil companies� The Office of the Four-Year Plan (which 
oversaw Germany’s policy of autarky) and the Armed Forces High Command 
(theoretically responsible for coordinating all the services but in practice serv-
ing as Hitler’s personal military staff with little authority over the other services) 
continued to purchase whatever they could from abroad (mainly diesel and fuel 
oil) while producing the most expensive products, especially aviation fuel and 
lubricants, domestically through either conventional drilling and refining or syn-
thesis� The German navy, by contrast, pursued three separate paths to securing 
cheap petroleum from abroad without going through the major oil companies: 
Estonian oil shale and crude oil from Iraq and from Mexico�26 
GERMANY AND THE SEARCH FOR OIL IN IRAQ, 1932–1936
Estonian oil shale was attractive in spite of its uncompetitive price since Estonia 
(an independent republic until 1940) could be a reliable source of supply even 
in wartime, because Germany thought it likely that it would still control access 
through the Baltic even during a conflict against Britain or the Soviet Union� Ex-
ports of petroleum extracted from shale to Germany began in 1937 and reached 
110,000 tons in 1939� But oil shale yielded only trivial amounts of naval fuel—the 
navy’s prewar contracts guaranteed deliveries of only three thousand tons of fuel 
oil a month (at well above the world market price) against a total consumption of 
44,300 tons� In any case, deliveries ended in 1940 after the Soviet Union annexed 
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Estonia; also, in August 1941 retreating Red Army troops destroyed the shale-
processing installations before the Wehrmacht could occupy them�27
With regard to Iraq, the impetus came from a German industrial consortium 
comprising four major steel companies—Ferrostaal, Otto Wolff, Mannesmann, 
and Stahlunion (although Ferrostaal was the dominant member)� This consor-
tium was a partner in the British Oil Development Company in Iraq�28 In fact, 
the German navy was a relative latecomer to this story—various civilian agencies 
had been considering the consequences of German participation in the BOD 
since 1930, when the newly formed company was still negotiating with the Iraqi 
government for a concession�29 BOD representatives had assured the German 
legation in Baghdad that their aim was to promote the “Open Door” in Iraq and 
break the “preferential position” enjoyed by the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), 
a multinational conglomerate composed of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
(after 1935 the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company), Royal Dutch/Shell, the Compagnie 
Française des Pétroles, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and the Stan-
dard Oil Company of New York�30 The IPC had secured a formal concession in 
1925, initially for the entire country but in 1931, when the company renegoti-
ated the concession, limited to thirty-two thousand square miles—that is, all of 
Iraq east of the Tigris River� The company discovered a massive oil field (Baba 
Gurgar) in 1927 near Kirkuk but had made little progress in developing it since 
then�31 In frustration, the Iraqi government turned in 1932 to the BOD, which 
received a concession covering forty-six thousand square miles west of the Tigris 
River�32 (The online version of this article reproduces period maps of crude oil 
concessions in the Middle East�)
From the start, there was considerable interest in the prospect of German 
firms earning tens of millions of Reichsmarks in industrial orders and Germany 
finding a cheap source of oil imports�33 There was also some trepidation—the 
German Foreign Office warned that if the BOD was too successful, it could spark 
a price war in Germany should the major oil companies decide to drive it from 
that market� While German consumers would benefit, such domestic petroleum 
producers as the chemical cartel IG Farben, which had made massive invest-
ments in synthetic-fuel production since 1925, would suffer heavy losses� This 
would have a ripple effect throughout the German economy, since expansion 
of synthetic-fuel production stimulated demand for labor, coal, and steel�34 Al-
though they were supportive of the ambitions of the BOD, senior Foreign Office 
officials suggested that the German government maintain its distance by reining 
in German diplomats in Iraq and refraining from extending official support to 
the company�35
Initially, most German officials were skeptical of the strategic value of Iraqi 
oil, especially in wartime, since it was vulnerable to blockade� But they were 
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impressed by the economic benefits for depression-ridden German industry 
and hoped that French and Italian participation in the BOD would improve the 
company’s prospects�36 Over the objections of IG Farben, the government agreed 
in 1932 to guarantee up to 50 percent of a million-Reichsmark investment made 
by the German industrial consortium to acquire half the shares in the BOD held 
by one of the founders of the company, Thomas Brown� Although a Scottish 
businessman, Brown enjoyed close ties to the German government through his 
efforts to promote closer economic relations between Germany and Persia dur-
ing the 1920s�37 By virtue of these special “founders’ rights,” the German firms 
could supply 38 percent of the BOD’s materiel requirements (with a total value 
of perhaps 100,000,000 RM) and receive 12 percent of the oil produced by the 
company�38 
The question of official German support for the BOD had initially been a 
purely civilian matter, with the ministries of economics, finance, and foreign af-
fairs taking responsibility� This changed between 1934 and 1936, when the Ger-
man consortium (in concert with its Italian partners) tried to acquire majority 
control of the BOD and of the holding company, Mosul Oil Fields, established to 
exploit the BOD’s concession rights�39 The armed services, the German navy in 
particular, now evinced considerable interest in the outcome of events in Iraq, as 
the rise of the Third Reich—and Hitler’s explicit commitment to a crash rearma-
ment program no matter what the cost—portended a significant rise in military 
oil consumption within the coming decade�40
The German consortium within the BOD sought to acquire control of the 
company by subscribing to private share offerings to raise capital now unavail-
able on London financial markets because of the machinations of the rival IPC 
to fund the BOD’s exploration efforts and cover the 
“dead rent” (i�e�, royalties to be paid before any oil 
production had started—starting at £100,000 in gold 
in 1933 and rising to £200,000 by 1937) owed to the 
Iraqi government� Although the BOD had yet to 
produce oil on a commercial scale (see table 2), the 
industrial consortium and its supporters within the 
German government were encouraged by favorable 
geological assessments by Alfred Bentz, Germany’s 
premier petroleum geologist and head of the oil divi-
sion of the Prussian Geological Survey� In 1935, he 
estimated that the BOD concession had twenty-three 
million tons of proven reserves and another hundred 
million tons of probable reserves�41 
1932  836
1933  917
1934 7,689
1935 27,408
1936 30,406
1937 31,836
1938 32,643
Source note: Figures drawn from DeGolyer and MacNaugh-
ton, Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics (Dallas: DeGolyer 
and MacNaughton, 2004).
TABLE 2
IRAQI OIL PRODUCTION 
(THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)
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Because of Germany’s balance-of-payments difficulties, the German con-
sortium had to pay for most of these new shares with industrial goods required 
for the construction of oil production infrastructure, including a railway to the 
Mediterranean through Syria� A rail line was necessary because the oil discovered 
in the BOD’s concession was too “heavy” (50 percent asphalt content) to pump—
although a pipeline was not out of the question in the future if the Germans 
resolved the technical obstacles� (Ferrostaal had, in the interim, also worked out 
an agreement with independent German and British refiners to sell them up to a 
million tons of heavy oil per year�)42 Total expenditures would have reached over 
20,000,000 RM by 1936, but the consortium was willing to move forward if the 
Reich put forward a 70 percent financial guarantee (although German bureau-
crats speculated it would have settled for 50 percent)�43
The question whether to support the push for a greater German stake in the 
BOD united military and civilian policy makers� The War Ministry supported 
any plan that could increase its supply of petroleum, especially since peacetime 
naval diesel and fuel-oil consumption was expected to rise 2�5 times between 
1935 and 1938� The navy’s supply/demand position was in fact so tight that it 
could only sustain current operations and had nothing left over to stockpile� 
Economics Minister Schacht, the man who had stabilized the Reichsmark in 1934 
without resorting to devaluation by embracing a rigid system of capital controls 
and bilateral trade agreements, liked the idea of taking control of the BOD� For 
him, it offered an easy means to reconcile the competing demands of rearming 
and of improving Germany’s balance of payments while reducing the country’s 
dependence on the U�S� and British major oil companies�44 The Foreign Office 
believed that both the British and the Iraqis would welcome a German “coun-
terweight” to the Italians and the Soviets in the Middle East, while the German 
minister to Iraq (Fritz Grobba) argued that building a railway to carry oil of the 
British Oil Development Company to the Mediterranean would earn Germany 
significant goodwill across the Middle East�45 Time was of the essence—the 
military and Economics Ministry had to start making preparations immediately 
to ensure that there were enough tankers to move the oil from Iraq to Germany 
and sufficient independent domestic refining capacity to process it, as most of 
the existing refineries were owned by the major oil companies, which would not 
process crude oil from rival firms�46
The only consistent opposition came from the Finance Ministry� After initially 
backing down in the face of unified support for additional financial support for 
the German industrial consortium in August 1935, the ministry dug in its heels 
when Ferrostaal requested guarantees a few months later for a further 15,000,000 
RM of expenditures (including royalty payments to the Iraqi government, 
which the Italians could no longer cover following the outbreak of the Second 
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Italo-Abyssinian War)�47 As Finance Minister Johann Ludwig von Krosigk ex-
plained to Schacht in December 1935, expanding the Third Reich’s financial 
exposure in Iraq made economic sense only if the German group within the 
BOD achieved majority control of the company, whereas the plan proposed by 
Ferrostaal left the German industrial consortium with only a 33 percent stake� 
The low quality of the oil discovered in the BOD’s concession was another im-
pediment� Even assuming it was possible to build a thousand-kilometer railway 
capable of transporting sufficient quantities of oil to the Mediterranean coast, 
the BOD’s higher operating costs would put it at a disadvantage compared with 
the capital-rich IPC, which would redouble its efforts to throttle its competitor, 
especially if the BOD tried to move excess oil to the Persian Gulf to compete for 
markets beyond Europe�48 
A meeting of key officials at the Economics Ministry in December 1935 failed 
to reach a consensus�49 The Finance Ministry remained skeptical, while the Eco-
nomics Ministry, the Naval High Command, and the Foreign Office continued 
to support a German takeover of the BOD in spite of the mounting costs�50 In any 
event, a decision had to be made soon� The Germans had the option to acquire a 
controlling interest in the company along with 50 percent of its future oil produc-
tion in concert with British and American partners, including the independent 
oilman William Rhodes Davis, who would subsequently play a major role in 
promoting the German-Mexican oil trade�51 
In January 1936, Raeder tried one last time to make the case for both the 
strategic and commercial viability of the BOD to Krosigk� The admiral claimed 
that the BOD’s concession could produce up to three million tons of crude oil per 
year, one-third of which would go to Germany, at a cost of only a pound per ton, 
quickly amortizing the costs of building the necessary tankers and storage facili-
ties� Also, recent technological advances meant that the heavy oil from the BOD 
concession could be refined into expensive fuels and lubricants� Raeder advised 
that at the very least Germany hold on to its shares in the BOD for a while longer, 
if only to bargain them for rights to “oil territories in Central or South America, 
which could after examination prove to be more advantageous in terms of sup-
plying Germany in either war or peace in view of their geographical situation�”52 
During a meeting with Krosigk on 25 March 1936, according to naval records, 
Wilhelm Keppler (one of Hitler’s primary economic advisers) apparently dis-
missed the navy’s plans as “superfluous, since the German Reich would within 
a short amount of time cover its entire demand for oil internally�” Keppler was 
more concerned, Raeder perceived, by the possibility that the navy might no 
longer be a customer for the vast quantities of expensive synthetic fuel to be 
produced domestically�53 Keppler later disputed the navy’s characterization of 
his position�54 He insisted that he had broached the matter of German control 
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of the BOD with no less an authority than the Führer� Hitler had been skeptical 
of supporting a German takeover of the BOD two years before, and nothing had 
changed since then� As far as Hitler was concerned, Germany lacked the neces-
sary foreign exchange, and anything short of majority control of the company was 
useless� Most importantly, the scheme would “incur for us the enmity of powerful 
international oil interests�”55 Finally, Hitler had little incentive to goad the British, 
so soon after the remilitarization of the Rhineland�56
Ultimately, the navy’s arguments proved unconvincing, and the Third Reich 
opted against issuing financial guarantees large enough to allow the German 
industrial consortium to take over the BOD�57 The Italians had already given up 
in 1935� The state-owned Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli, which controlled the 
Italian stake in the BOD, had reassessed its position due to the threat of League 
of Nations oil sanctions following the invasion of Abyssinia� Italy could hardly 
depend on oil deliveries from Iraq when they traveled by pipeline through the 
French League of Nations mandate of Syria or the British mandates of Transjor-
dan and Palestine� The Italians therefore sold their stake in the BOD to the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company and chose instead to concentrate their efforts in Albania�58
With the Italians out of the way, there was nothing stopping the IPC from tak-
ing control of the BOD, initially by covering the “dead rent” for 1936� The Iraqi 
prime minister complained to Grobba that the Italians had been paid off by the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (then 51 percent owned by the British government) 
with promises to continue oil deliveries during the Abyssinian War� In other 
words, he charged, the British government, in collusion with the oil companies, 
had rejected the use of oil sanctions over Italy’s brutal invasion of Abyssinia in 
order to facilitate Rome’s capitulation in the struggle for control of Middle East-
ern oil�59 There is no evidence to support Grobba’s claims (repeated uncritically 
by several historians) that the British government had been reluctant to push for 
sanctions less out of fear of driving Italy into an alliance with Germany than out of 
a desire to take control of the BOD�60 Nevertheless, it is difficult to take issue with 
the verdict that the Reich abandoned the BOD less out of narrow concerns over 
the economic viability of the project than for broader strategic considerations�61
Ferrostaal eventually (at the end of 1936) sold off its interest in the BOD for 
£1,250,000 in foreign exchange and future orders to the IPC, which in turn cre-
ated a subsidiary (Mosul Holdings Ltd�, renamed the Mosul Petroleum Company 
in 1941) that acquired control of the BOD in 1937�62 The Naval High Command 
was naturally disappointed by this turn of events� The one consolation was that it 
might be able to use the proceeds of the sale of the German shares in the BOD for 
“Mexican oil rights�”63 But after the sale of Ferrostaal’s shares went through, the 
only pledge the navy could secure from the Economics Ministry was a vague as-
surance that it could use the earnings to hunt for other overseas oil concessions�64
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THE SHIFT TO MEXICO, 1936–1940
German interest in acquiring an oil concession in Mexico predated the First 
World War� German geologists had surveyed the country as early as 1912, and the 
Deutsche Bank (which controlled the major independent German oil company, 
Deutsche Petroleum), the German Foreign Office, and the Imperial German 
Navy all expressed interest in securing a concession in Mexico as an alternative 
oil source that would allow Germany to break the Standard Oil Company’s domi-
nation of the European market� In May 1914, the Mexican dictator Victoriano 
Huerta even offered the German ambassador a 150,000-square-kilometer con-
cession in Tampico, which would be expropriated from its American owners, in 
a vain attempt to solicit German support to prop up his regime, which collapsed 
in July under pressure from the U�S� government�65 (See the online version of this 
article for a reproduction of a period map of Mexican oil fields�) 
After the BOD fiasco, the German government, even though Germany lacked 
the spare refinery capacity to process any crude oil besides that imported by the 
major oil companies, gave the navy permission in 1937 to pursue opportunities 
to purchase oil concessions in Latin America� This was the German navy’s third 
and final attempt to secure its own independent source of supply before 1939� 
There were two provisos: the navy’s efforts could “in no way disrupt the internal 
petroleum economy,” and the Third Reich would not consider providing support 
to any endeavor involving “politically unreliable countries�”66 The Spanish Civil 
War, which began the year before, lent additional urgency to the search for new 
suppliers� Naval fuel consumption increased after the Germans joined “nonin-
tervention” patrols with the British and French while supporting operations by 
Nationalist forces and the Condor Legion of German volunteers� Just as impor-
tantly, and also in 1937, Shell and Standard Oil of New Jersey began demanding 
full payment in hard currency�67 
The navy moved quickly� As early as September 1936 it had asked the German 
commercial attaché in Mexico City to query the Mexicans about whether they 
were interested in establishing a partnership between Germany and Mexico’s 
state-owned company, Petromex, to start production on land within Mexico’s na-
tional petroleum reserve�68 The Mexicans initially appeared receptive, but negoti-
ations had stalled by 1938, owing to skepticism on the part of the German Foreign 
Office and German oil companies (which worried about antagonizing their U�S� 
and British counterparts), as well as the reluctance of the Mexican government 
to conclude an intergovernmental accord with the Third Reich when domestic 
nationalist hostility against foreign control of Mexico’s oil was running high�69 
The Mexican government’s nationalization of its oil industry in March 1938—
and with it the expropriation of the properties owned by U�S�, British, and Dutch 
oil companies—afforded the Germans an unparalleled opportunity to corner 
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the market for Mexican oil�70 The major oil companies had retaliated against 
nationalization by launching a boycott of expropriated Mexican oil, and Mexico 
was desperate for new customers as well as technical and financial support to 
continue increasing output (see table 3)�71 Whatever Mexico’s misgivings about 
the Third Reich, there were no other customers for its oil (besides independent 
companies that were themselves planning to sell to Germany), especially after 
negotiations with Italy and Japan failed� The Mexicans were in such desperate 
straits that they were willing to accept payment through barter� The German 
navy had meanwhile established a partnership with the Dresdner Bank, which 
was being used for “camouflage” and handled negotiations with the Mexicans 
through a subsidiary�72
In April 1938 the Naval High Command asked the Economics Ministry to 
release £600,000 of the foreign exchange earned from the sale of the German 
shares in the BOD to purchase an oil concession in Mexico�73 The German navy 
played fast and loose with the truth to get its way� According to the German min-
ister in Mexico City, the Mexicans were not nearly as eager to grant a concession 
as the Naval High Command claimed; their problem was disposing of excess oil 
they already had on hand�74 But even if a concession agreement went through, 
production would not start, according to the geologist Bentz, until “the end of 
1941 at the earliest.”75 Most importantly, the navy failed to convince its critics that 
Germany had more to gain than it would lose through closer ties with Mexico� 
The Economics Ministry had no objection to the navy continuing to buy Mexican 
oil, but it opposed any intergovernmental accord and rejected the navy’s request 
for foreign exchange� Instead, it tried to convince the navy that oil autarky was 
within sight, while also confessing its reluctance to incur the wrath of the major 
oil companies by defying their boycott of Mexico�76 
The Third Reich was dependent on the U�S� and Brit-
ish companies to sell them petroleum that could then 
be stockpiled, and for that reason Germany could not 
afford “to annoy” them just yet�77 
Raeder tried again in September and December 
1938 through personal appeals to Göring to release 
the requested £600,000 to begin preparatory work� 
The Mexican offer was almost too good to be true� 
Unlike in Iraq, where the logistical challenges of 
moving oil from the interior to the coast were formi-
dable, Mexico was offering participation in a state-
owned concession only sixty kilometers from ports 
on the Atlantic coast�78 From geological estimates 
completed by Bentz in 1936 and 1937, Raeder was 
1933 34,000
1934 38,172
1935 40,241
1936 41,028
1937 46,907
1938 38,506
1939 42,898
1940 44,036
TABLE 3
MEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION 
(THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)
Source note: Figures drawn from DeGolyer and MacNaugh-
ton, Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics.
Summer2015Review.indb   104 4/21/15   1:50 PM
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
 T O P R A N I  1 0 5
convinced that the concession in question could yield up to ten million tons of 
oil per year (with 20 percent going to the Mexican government), with shipments 
to Germany beginning a year after the start of operations�79 All of this could be 
had for an expenditure of only £600,000 in foreign exchange, which on the open 
market would pay for a mere 150,000 tons of petroleum� Plus, Germany could sell 
any surplus from its operations in Mexico for hard currency� As long as Germany 
took the “necessary precautions,” its Mexican oil concession might even serve as 
a source of supply in wartime�80 
Opposition to the navy’s plans now came from a former ally—the Economics 
Ministry—which tried to convince the Naval High Command to abandon its 
quixotic efforts� During an interagency conference on 15 November 1938, the 
ministry warned the navy that increasing exports to Mexico to pay for imported 
oil could undermine Germany’s overall financial position�81 The German navy 
stuck to its guns, but its efforts proved fruitless; the navy and the Dresdner Bank 
eventually had to abandon their negotiations with Mexico City for a concession 
in the face of implacable opposition from the Economics Ministry, which again 
denied the navy’s application for the release of foreign exchange in December 
1938�82 
There was one other possibility: the Mexicans were still sitting on copious 
amounts of oil and willing to sell on the basis of barter with deferred payment� 
Through supply contracts with the aforementioned William Davis (who owned 
concessions within the rich Poza Rica oil field and had been pushing for closer 
German-Mexican commercial relations since 1933), the German navy took full 
advantage of the Mexicans’ difficulties following nationalization�83 In the short 
run, it acquired extra oil to cover its additional requirements during the Spanish 
Civil War� Also, Mexico quickly became an invaluable source of oil for the navy in 
its redoubled efforts to find more-accommodating suppliers than the major U�S� 
and British companies, such as Shell and Standard Oil, which had been demand-
ing full payment in hard currency since 1937� The navy’s schemes were a thorn 
in the side of the major oil companies, which started making vague threats and 
sought to discredit Davis�84 
The major oil companies also dangled a number of carrots to keep the Third 
Reich from violating their boycott against Mexico� Both Standard Oil of New 
Jersey and Royal Dutch/Shell (the two foreign firms with the largest interests in 
Mexico prior to nationalization) offered to place additional commercial orders 
with German firms and accept partial compensation through clearing agree-
ments�85 In August 1938, Shell went farther and made the Third Reich an offer it 
could not refuse: Shell would replace any oil imported from Mexico and accept 
payment on a clearing basis� The navy was not fooled—Shell’s offer was a ploy to 
poison Germany’s relationship with Mexico, which had been a reliable partner 
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even during the Sudeten crisis that year� Both Standard and Shell, on the other 
hand, had created numerous “difficulties,” including diverting tankers heading 
to Germany to Britain� Mexico was also one of the few oil producers willing 
to accept payment in Reichsmarks, and if Germany cut ties there, it would be 
completely at the mercy of the major U�S� and British oil companies� Rather 
than knuckle under to the major companies’ blackmail, the navy pointed out 
that “there are in the world thousands of independent oil companies besides 
the majors, among which many would be ready under favorable conditions to 
undertake the delivery of all manner of fuels to Germany�”86 Economics Minister 
Walther Funk did not dispute that his department had sought to maintain good 
relations with the major oil companies but countered that this had been done in 
accordance with Germany’s overall energy-security strategy, which stressed the 
fulfillment of immediate requirements�87
The available evidence seems to support the navy’s argument� 
Mexico, particularly under the left-wing president Lázaro Cárdenas, 
had little affinity for the Third Reich, but it had to stifle its political 
misgivings to make ends meet�88 The Reich imported 649,216 tons of 
Mexican petroleum in 1938, compared with 281,266 tons in 1933, 
much of it arranged by private firms� Imports continued to rise right 
up to the outbreak of the Second World War� Davis’s oil company, for 
instance, exported during the first eight months of 1939 1,972,609 
tons of Mexican oil, most of which went to Germany—by now the 
largest customer for Mexican petroleum products�89 As a result, the 
German navy’s reserves of diesel fuel rose from 262,000 tons on 1 January 1938 
to 650,000 on war’s eve (about three years’ wartime consumption), even though 
its share of domestic German production had not increased�90
By the time the Second World War began, the German navy’s efforts to cover 
the differential between its expected wartime consumption and actual domestic 
production by stockpiling large quantities of imported oil had, in the assessment 
of one historian, been consigned “to the realm of fantasy�”91 Raeder complained 
that the other government departments had been “dismissive” of the navy’s sug-
gestions, which he claimed could have provided Germany with the means to ac-
cumulate large military and civilian stockpiles� The Economics Ministry, Raeder 
contended in a particularly nasty missive of June 1940, had been in the pocket 
of the U�S� and British major oil companies, and its policies were “disastrous” for 
Germany’s energy security� There was no better proof of the soundness of the 
navy’s alternative strategy, Raeder argued, than the fact that Göring had been 
forced following the war’s outbreak “to withdraw petroleum from the navy and 
transfer it to the economy and other branches of the armed services�”92 
Walther Funk at the Nuremberg war 
crimes trials
U.S. government photo
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After the war, Raeder bragged that the navy had managed to stockpile roughly 
a million tons of petroleum before the war from a variety of sources—“most of 
all from Mexico�”93 Was his boasting justified? Yes and no� At the onset of the 
Second World War, Germany’s naval fuel reserves were small compared with 
those of Japan after Pearl Harbor (forty-three million barrels in total—about 90 
percent of which was controlled by the Imperial Japanese Navy) or even Italy in 
July 1940 (1,666,674 tons for all three services)� These figures worked out to two 
years’ wartime consumption, including domestic oil production, for the Japanese 
navy and less than five months for the Italian navy (leaving aside army and air 
force requirements, and based on the rate of consumption during the first quarter 
of 1941, since Italy’s domestic production was minuscule)�94 
German naval reserves at the start of the war were therefore much smaller in 
terms of volume than those of either Italy or Japan, but the German navy could 
at least fall back on a burgeoning domestic oil industry (both synthetic and 
crude), as well as a share of Romanian oil production� Japan and Italy were not 
so fortunate, once they lost access to overseas imports and expended their prewar 
reserves� Most importantly, the German navy’s position was much stronger than 
that of either its sister services or of the German war economy as a whole� At 
least some of the credit is attributable to the navy’s success in securing additional 
imports from Mexico before the outbreak of hostilities� The Third Reich went to 
war with a reserve stock of only 1,898,000 tons, which amounted to less than six 
months’ worth of peacetime consumption�95 As of 25 November 1939, however, 
the navy alone possessed reserves of 725,000 cubic meters (cbm—i�e�, 6�3 barrels 
of oil, or a little less than one ton) of diesel fuel and 382,000 cbm of fuel oil, not 
including 50,000 tons of diesel fuel stored abroad� On the basis of the average rate 
of consumption during the first three months of the war (8,100 cbm of diesel and 
71,500 cbm of fuel oil), and assuming no new construction in 1940, the diesel 
reserves including U-boat consumption would have lasted for more than seven 
years, while supplies of fuel oil would suffice for five and a half months�96 Suffi-
cient quantities of diesel fuel for U-boats were available until 1944, but the supply 
of fuel oil tightened after 1940, when the navy had to start transferring some of its 
stocks to the German army and then the Italian navy�97 Like the industrious ant, 
the navy was punished for its success by having to support unprepared grasshop-
pers across Germany and Italy� 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND HARD CHOICES
No one can deny that a war machine in the Hydrocarbon Age requires fuel, but 
not all fuels are created equal� Nor for that matter are the interests of consum-
ers, even within a single nation, identical� Both historical and contemporary 
energy analysts would be wise to avoid a monolithic understanding of the role 
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of energy (strategic or otherwise) within a given society� Such an understanding 
has unfortunately been the case with the Third Reich� Building on the work of 
wartime analysts such as those of the U�S� Strategic Bombing Survey, students of 
Germany’s prewar oil policy have focused their attention on the Third Reich’s 
development of synthetic fuel from coal as a means of breaking Germany’s de-
pendence on overseas oil sources that were controlled by its enemies, priced in 
foreign exchange, and susceptible to blockade in wartime�98 
Synthetic fuel did indeed afford Germany a measure of energy independence 
on the eve of the Second World War, but only for certain kinds of petroleum 
products, namely, lighter fuels, such as gasoline� While the German army and air 
force enjoyed considerable benefits from prewar policies, the navy did not and 
was forced to pursue imaginative means of securing the diesel fuel and fuel oil it 
required but Germany’s domestic synthetic- and crude-oil industries could not 
provide� The bitter feud that ensued exposed one of the contradictory tendencies 
at the heart of the Third Reich’s supposedly totalitarian approach to rearmament 
—one between a dominant, “continental” faction obsessed with “autarky” and a 
navy that retained a “maritime” perspective�99 Leaving aside whether its assess-
ments of German prospects in Iraq and Mexico were justified, the navy’s pursuit of 
an independent energy-security strategy ran afoul of the overall energy-security 
strategy of the Third Reich� That larger strategy sought to appease the U�S� and 
British oil companies in peacetime even as it stockpiled supplies and built up its 
synthetic-fuel industry to wage a war that would forever free Germany from its 
dependence on overseas raw materials—in part by expropriating the assets of the 
very companies with which it had traded in peacetime�100 
Since the German navy (aside from its U-boats) played a relatively minor role 
during the Second World War, it is tempting to dismiss the story of its efforts 
to secure oil from Iraq and Mexico during the 1930s as a historical curiosity�101 
But this would be a mistake, for those episodes afford us insight concerning 
Germany’s wider grand strategy� Germany did not reject a stake in the oil of Iraq 
or Mexico merely because of financial constraints� Starting in October 1936, 
around the time Ferrostaal began selling off its interest in the BOD, the Third 
Reich would expend 574,000,000 RM on synthetic-fuel projects (partially offset 
by higher duties on imported crude oil) during just the first year of the so-called 
Four-Year Plan of 1936�102 Compared with such astronomical sums, several mil-
lion Reichsmarks in the form of industrial goods or foreign exchange appears to 
have been a relatively small price to pay for hundreds of thousands, if not mil-
lions, of tons of Iraqi or Mexican crude oil per year� 
The problem, instead, was that the navy’s ambitions clashed with the Third 
Reich’s overarching strategy, since the latter was geared for preparing for war at 
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the earliest possible time� The German navy’s perspective on energy security was 
shaped by the fact that it required years, if not decades, to design and construct 
platforms capable of implementing any naval strategy—be it a guerre de course 
using cruisers or a “Mahanian” concept centered on capital ships� The navy had 
been prepared to wait a decade between the design and commissioning of its first 
“pocket battleship” in 1933 (Deutschland); waiting a handful of years while Ger-
man interests developed new oil fields in Iraq or Mexico was not a tremendous 
sacrifice�103 
But the Third Reich as a whole had only a narrow window of opportunity 
to achieve its continental objectives� This meant that decisions, especially after 
1938, concerning the allocation of economic and financial resources would be 
made on the basis of Germany’s immediate needs� Such thinking, for instance, 
also encouraged the German air force to prioritize the production of medium 
and tactical bombers over four-engine heavy bombers, even though German of-
ficers shared the prevailing strategic consensus regarding the potential efficacy 
of strategic bombing�104 In the case of the navy, whose oil-related schemes would 
require considerable time to reach fruition, the Third Reich had no option but 
to maintain its businesslike relationship with the U�S� and British major oil com-
panies, which had proved relatively accommodating with regard to Germany’s 
crippling shortage of foreign exchange� Their oil might have been more expensive 
than that offered by either Iraq or Mexico, but it was available immediately, and 
its purchase did not jeopardize relations with other great powers� Within this 
context, even Hitler realized that the German navy’s confrontational policies vis-
à-vis the oil companies promised little material gain over the short run, and that 
at a potentially high strategic cost� 
From the perspective of contemporary energy security, the example of the 
German navy before 1939 represents a valuable lesson in resource management 
in an era of tight economic and financial constraints� Force development, espe-
cially in peacetime, when a nation has yet to mobilize completely, requires hard 
choices about whose requirements can be met and at what cost to other national 
consumers� In a constrained resource environment, a policy that seeks to maxi-
mize advantage for any one service may entail costs that run contrary to interests 
of rival institutions� Rather than deluding themselves that it is possible to achieve 
security in every area, civilian and military decision makers should recognize the 
potential trade-offs that their decisions can have on other institutions residing 
under the national security umbrella� Most importantly, they must always be 
prepared to adjust their expectations and reconcile their parochial interests to 
the evolving demands and priorities of national strategy in a dynamic strategic 
environment� 
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 1� The figures on per capita consumption are 
from United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
[hereafter USSBS], The German Oil Industry: 
Ministerial Report, Team 78 (Washington, 
D�C�: U�S� Government Printing Office [here-
after GPO], 1945), p� 7� The specific chemical 
properties of various kinds of crude oil affect 
the volume of space it occupies� One ton 
of oil can fill between six and eight barrels, 
depending on its gravity and viscosity� For 
the sake of clarity, throughout this study, one 
ton of oil equals seven barrels of oil, and vice 
versa�
 2� One of the measures that mitigated the effects 
of the blockade in the First World War was 
a relatively successful effort at stockpiling 
petroleum before the war� The 343,000 tons 
accumulated equaled 10 percent of Germany’s 
wartime consumption� The key assessment of 
oil’s strategic role during the First World War 
remains Ferdinand Friedensburg, Das Erdöl 
im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, Ger�: Ferdinand Enke 
Verlag, 1939), esp� pp� 53–58 (Allied blockade 
measures), 69–80 (Germany’s petroleum 
supply during the war), and 121–28 (oil’s 
influence over the war’s outcome)� 
 3� Foreign exchange refers to assets held by a 
nation in foreign currencies� Imports usually 
require payment in either the currency of the 
exporting nation or currencies that are freely 
convertible into others� Because it tends to 
keep its value and is both a reliable store of 
wealth and a trusted medium of exchange, 
a convertible currency (or gold)—often re-
ferred to as a hard currency—is purchased by 
national banks as a “reserve currency” to back 
up a local currency or liabilities� 
 4� Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft AG, “Treibstoff-
wirtschaft in der Welt und in Deutschland,” 
April 1938, T-84/51 (EAP 66-c-2-10/22), 
National Archives and Records Administra-
tion, College Park, Md� [hereafter NARA]�
 5� From 1924 to 1933, one U�S� dollar was worth 
on average four Reichsmarks, while one Brit-
ish pound fetched about twenty Reichsmarks 
until 1931 (when Britain went off the gold 
standard)� After taking power, the National 
Socialists set an artificially high exchange rate 
to facilitate imports, in spite of Germany’s 
trade deficits� Between 1933 and 1939, one 
dollar equaled 2�5 RM and one pound about 
12 RM� Harold Marcuse, Historical Dollar-to-
Marks Currency Conversion Page, www 
�history�ucsb�edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/
currency�htm�
 6� Additional factors exacerbating Germany’s 
financial difficulties were international 
antipathy to the Third Reich for its suspen-
sion of repayment of foreign debts and for its 
brutality, as well as emigration by persecuted 
political and minority groups (especially Ger-
man Jews)� During the first major economic 
crisis of the regime, in the summer of 1934, 
total foreign currency reserves sufficed to pay 
for only one week’s worth of imports� Wil-
liamson Murray, The Change in the European 
Balance of Power, 1938–1939: The Path to 
Ruin (Princeton, N�J�: Princeton Univ� Press, 
1984), pp� 4–17; Adam Tooze, The Wages of 
Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the 
Nazi Economy (New York: Viking, 2006), pp� 
37–134, esp� 49–50, 68–86�
Summer2015Review.indb   110 4/21/15   1:50 PM
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
 T O P R A N I  1 1 1
 7� Besides Murray’s and Tooze’s books, the 
preceding discussion is drawn from Anand 
Toprani, “Oil and Grand Strategy: Great 
Britain and Germany, 1918–1941” (PhD diss�, 
Georgetown University, 2012), pp� 346–408; 
USSBS, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on 
the German War Economy (Washington, D�C�: 
GPO, n�d�), pp� 73–78; USSBS, German Oil 
Industry; USSBS, Oil Division: Final Report 
(Washington, D�C�: GPO, 1945); Anthony 
Krammer, “Fueling the Third Reich,” Technol-
ogy and Culture 19, no� 3 (1978), pp� 394–422; 
and Raymond Stokes, “The Oil Industry in 
Nazi Germany, 1936–1945,” Business History 
Review 59, no� 2 (Summer 1985), pp� 254–77� 
 8� Dietrich Eichholtz, Deutsche Politik und 
rumänisches Öl, 1938–1941: Eine Studie über 
Erdölimperialismus (Leipzig, Ger�: Leipziger 
Universitätsverlag, 2005), pp� 13–16� 
 9� David Haglund, “‘Gray Areas’ and Raw Mate-
rials,” Inter-American Economic Affairs 36, no� 
3 (1982), p� 34� For more-detailed discussion, 
see H� W� Arndt, The Economic Lessons of 
the Nineteen-Thirties (London: Routledge, 
1963), pp� 176–206, and Günther Reimann, 
The Vampire Economy: Doing Business under 
Fascism (New York: Vanguard, 1939)� 
 10� Some companies did agree, however, to keep 
a portion of their profits in Germany and 
used them instead to purchase German in-
dustrial goods� Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of 
Multinational Enterprise: American Business 
Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge, Mass�: 
Harvard Univ� Press, 1974), pp� 237–38� 
 11� The key source on the BOD is Helmut  
Mejcher, Die Politik und das Öl im Nahen 
Osten: I. Der Kampf der Mächte und Konzerne 
vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, Fed� 
Rep� Ger�: Klett-Cotta, 1980), pp� 102–45, but 
it suffers from the defects of a narrow source 
base—Mejcher relied largely on the records of 
the German Finance Ministry, which means 
that his narrative omits certain key details 
and is sometimes overly speculative� See also 
Mejcher, “The International Petroleum Cartel 
(1928), Arab and Turkish Oil Aspirations 
and German Oil Policy towards the Middle 
East on the Eve of the Second World War,” 
in Oil, the Middle East, North Africa and the 
Industrial States, ed� Klaus Jürgen Gantzel and 
Helmut Mejcher (Paderborn, Fed� Rep� Ger�: 
F� Schöningh, 1984), pp� 27–59, esp� 54–57, 
and Mejcher, The Struggle for a New Middle 
East in the 20th Century: Studies in Imperial 
Design and National Politics (Piscataway, N�J�: 
Transaction, 2007), pp� 371–82� 
 12� Klaus Volland, Das Dritte Reich und Mexiko: 
Studien zur Entwicklung des deutsch- 
mexikanischen Verhältnisses 1933–1942 unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ölpolitik 
(Frankfurt am Main, Fed� Rep� Ger�: Peter 
Lang, 1976), pp� 83–174, is indispensable on 
the role of oil in German-Mexican relations� 
Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico and the United States 
in the Oil Controversy, 1917–1942 (Austin: 
Univ� of Texas Press, 1977), pp� 173–216 (pp� 
209–13 for Mexican trade with the Axis), is 
the best work on the Mexican nationaliza-
tion and its immediate aftermath from the 
Mexican perspective� 
 13� The primary studies of the German navy’s oil 
policy during the Third Reich are Wilhelm 
Meier-Dörnberg, Die Ölversorgung der 
Kriegsmarine 1935 bis 1945 (Freiburg, Fed� 
Rep� Ger�: Rombach, 1973), passim, esp� 
pp� 31–44 for the navy’s efforts in Iraq and 
Mexico, and Hans-Jürgen Zetzsche, “Logistik 
und Operationen: Die Mineralölversorgung 
der Kriegsmarine im Zweiten Weltkrieg” 
(PhD diss�, Christian-Albrechts-Universität 
zu Kiel, 1986), pp� 18–102, esp� 46–72� Erich 
Raeder’s memoirs are broadly accurate but 
unreliable in their particulars: Mein Leben: 
Von 1935 bis Spandau (Tübingen-Neckar, 
Fed� Rep� Ger�: Verlag Fritz Schlichtenmayer, 
1957), pp� 58–65� Titus Kockel utilized previ-
ously unavailable sources, such as the records 
of the Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften 
und Rohstoffe [hereafter BGR] in his studies 
of prewar German oil policy, but his findings 
concerning the navy’s efforts in Iraq and 
Mexico are derived largely from the existing 
secondary literature: Kockel, “Geologie und 
deutsche Ölpolitik: Die frühe Karriere des 
Erdölgeologen Alfred Theodor Bentz” (PhD 
diss�, Technische Universität Berlin, 2003); 
Kockel, Deutsche Ölpolitik (Berlin: Akade-
mie Verlag, 2005); and Dietrich Eichholtz 
and Titus Kockel, Von Krieg zu Krieg: Zwei 
Studien zur deutschen Erdölpolitik in der 
Zwischenkriegszeit (Leipzig, Ger�: Leipziger 
Universitätsverlag, 2008), pp� 151–60�
 14� Military History Research Unit [hereafter 
MGFA], Germany and the Second World War, 
vol� 1, The Build-Up of German Aggression 
(Oxford, U�K�: Clarendon, 1990), pp� 458–62�
Summer2015Review.indb   111 4/21/15   1:50 PM
21
Toprani: “The Navy’s Success Speaks for Itself”?: The German Navy’s Indepe
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 1 1 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 15� Zetzsche, “Logistik und Operationen,” pp� 
46–49�
 16� Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der Kriegsma-
rine, p� 31�
 17� Raeder to Göring, “Oelbedarf der Kriegsma-
rine,” 4 September 1936, T-77/101 (Wi/IF 
5�433), NARA� 
 18� Armed Forces High Command, Defense-
Economy Staff, “Aktennotiz auf Grund einer 
Besprechung mit Herrn Ministerialrat Dr� 
Fetzer OKM betr� Oelversorgung,” 17 June 
1938, T-77/683 (Wi/VI� 356), NARA� Much 
of the increase since 1933 was attributable to 
the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 
which authorized the German navy to build 
up a fleet with a total tonnage 35 percent that 
of the Royal Navy�
 19� MGFA, Build-Up of German Aggression, pp� 
456–72�
 20� Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegslei-
tung (Frankfurt am Main, Fed� Rep� Ger�: Ber-
nard & Graefe, 1970–75), vol� 1, pp� 38–65; 
MGFA, Build-Up of German Aggression, pp� 
472–79�
 21� Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der Kriegsma-
rine, pp� 29–30; MGFA, Build-Up of German 
Aggression, pp� 479, 500; Tooze, Wages of De-
struction, pp� 287–304, esp� 288–89, 294–95; 
Zetzsche, “Logistik und Operationen,” pp� 
58–60� Both Göring and elements of the  
Wehrmacht tried and failed to circumvent 
Hitler’s order to prioritize the navy’s raw 
materials requirements; Jost Dülffer, Weimar, 
Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flot-
tenbau, 1920–1939 (Düsseldorf, Fed� Rep� 
Ger�: Droste Verlag, 1973), pp� 509–12� 
 22� The best source on prewar German naval 
construction and strategy is still Dülffer’s 
Weimar, Hitler und die Marine, esp� pp� 419–
34, for the economic context of naval rearma-
ment in the wake of the Four-Year Plan of 
1936� Unfortunately, Dülffer gives petroleum 
policy short shrift� He acknowledges that the 
German navy was “skeptical” of the ambitions 
of the Four-Year Plan with regard to energy 
independence and would have preferred that 
the extra resources be committed to rearma-
ment rather than domestic raw material 
production (pp� 430–31)� But Dülffer mis-
takenly claims that since the Four-Year Plan 
did not hinder naval construction, Raeder 
saw no reason to interfere with government 
policy—an unjustified conclusion, as we shall 
see� 
 23� Zetzsche, “Logistik und Operationen,” pp� 
52–56, 58�
 24� Wulf, “Die Ölversorgung Deutschlands in 
der Marine,” n�d� [ca� 1938], enclosed with 
“Unterlagen (Heft 2) K� Kap� Assmann,” n�d�, 
T-1022/4076 (PG 33957), NARA� 
 25� German Navy, Defense-Economy Office, 
“Bedeutung der deutschen Mineralölversor-
gung für die Kriegsmarine,” 5 August 1940, 
T-1022/1772 (PG 32209), NARA� Before the 
war, most of Germany’s oil imports originated 
in the United States, Latin America, and the 
Dutch East Indies� 
 26� Besides the aforementioned secondary 
sources, the following discussion of the Ger-
man navy’s unsuccessful efforts in Iraq and 
Mexico is based largely on the contemporane-
ous summaries included in Raeder to Keitel et 
al�, “Ölversorgung der Kriegsmarine,” 6 May 
1940; and Raeder to Funk et al�, 27 June 1940; 
both in T-1022/3405 (PG 31762/B), NARA� 
 27� Manfred Rasch, “Zur Mineralölpolitik der 
Kriegsmarine: Dokumente aus dem Jahre 
1935,” Militärgeschichte Mitteilungen 37, no� 
1 (1985), pp� 71–101, esp� 82–85� See also 
Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der Kriegsma-
rine, pp� 33–34�
 28� Corporate relations are summarized in 
Dennis Kumetat, “The Failure of German 
Business and Economic Policy towards Iraq 
in the 1930s: The Case of the German Arms 
and Steel Company Otto Wolff, Cologne,” 
Al-Abhath: Journal of the American University 
of Beirut 55/56 (2007/2008), pp� 147–73�
 29� Owing to space constraints, it is impracti-
cal to delve deeply into the intricacies of 
the Reich’s relationship with the BOD� The 
complicated history between 1930 and 1936 
is summarized in Jäger, “Memorandum über 
die Mosul Oil Fields Ltd�,” 22 January 1942, 
enclosed with Jäger to Griebel, “Iraq,” 23 
January 1942, T-77/660 (Wi/Vi� 142), NARA� 
The 22 January memo appears to be based 
on an earlier paper prepared by Ferrostaal to 
justify its request for government financial 
assistance in taking over the BOD: “Zusam-
menfassende Darstellung über Mosul Oil 
Fields Ltd�,” 18 November 1935, R2/16816, 
Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde [hereafter 
BA-B]� The key documents may be found 
Summer2015Review.indb   112 4/21/15   1:50 PM
22
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
 T O P R A N I  1 1 3
in R 2/16815–16816, BA-B; R 92244–92248, 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes 
[hereafter PAAA]; and T-77/645 (Wi/Vi� 13a, 
b), NARA� The financial composition of both 
the BOD and its subsidiary Mosul Oil Fields 
is summarized in “B�O�D� Co� Ltd�” and “Mo-
sul Oil Fields, Ltd�,” n�d� [after August 1936], 
R 8119/8369, BA-B� For secondary-source 
accounts, besides Mejcher, Die Politik und 
das Öl, see Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung 
der Kriegsmarine, pp� 34–39, and Zetzsche, 
“Logistik und Operationen,” pp� 65–68� It is 
still worth consulting Fritz Grobba’s account 
of German participation in the BOD, in spite 
of its factual errors, if only because he was 
a direct participant in those events: Fritz 
Grobba, Männer und Mächte im Orient: 25 
Jahre diplomatischer Tätigkeit im Orient (Göt-
tingen, Fed� Rep� Ger�: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 
1967), pp� 85–94�
 30� Today these companies are known as BP, 
Shell, Total, and (for the two Standard Oils)
ExxonMobil� 
 31� Litten, “Erdöl im Irak,” 31 January 1930, R 
92244, PAAA� See also “Niederschrift über 
die Bedeutung der deutschen Quote in der 
British Oil Development Co�,” 25 May 1931, 
R 92245, PAAA; and Grobba, “Weltmarkt-
perspektiven für Irak-Petroleum,” 9 February 
1933, R 92246, PAAA� 
 32� The history of Iraq’s oil industry during the 
interwar era, as well as the role of the IPC in 
stifling oil production, is covered in Walter 
Adams, James Brock, and John Blair, “Retard-
ing the Development of Iraq’s Oil Resources: 
An Episode in Oleaginous Diplomacy, 1927– 
1939,” Journal of Economic Issues 28, no� 1 
(1993), pp� 69–93; John Blair, The Control of 
Oil (New York: Pantheon, 1976), pp� 80–85; 
Gregory Nowell, Mercantile States and the 
World Oil Cartel, 1900–1939 (Ithaca, N�Y�: 
Cornell Univ� Press, 1994), pp� 270–75; Edith 
Penrose and E� F� Penrose, Iraq: International 
Relations and National Development (London: 
Ernest Benn, 1978), passim; and Daniel Sil-
verfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire (New York: 
Oxford Univ� Press, 1986), pp� 94–105�
 33� Grobba, “Erdöl im Irak,” 19 March 1930[?], R 
92244, PAAA� 
 34� IG Farben’s controversial role in synthetic-
fuel production before and during the Third 
Reich is assessed in Peter Hayes, Industry 
and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era 
(Cambridge, U�K�: Cambridge Univ� Press, 
1987), pp� 36–42, and Thomas Parke Hughes, 
“Technological Momentum in History: 
Hydrogenation in Germany, 1898–1933,” Past 
and Present 44, no� 1 (1969), pp� 106–32� 
 35� Breitfeld, “Memorandum,” 28 April 1930; and 
Minute for Curtius, “Stehen die deutschen 
Warenlieferungen für die British Oil Develop-
ment Company (B�O�D�) im Irak im rechten 
Verhältnis zu dem politischen Risiko?,” 6 May 
1930; both in R 92244, PAAA�
 36� Minister of Economics, “Finanzierung der 
deutschen Beteiligung an der British Oil 
Development Co�,” 10 June 1932, R 92245, 
PAAA; Finance Ministry, “Irak-Oel- 
Konsortium,” 27 February 1934, R2/16815, 
BA-B�
 37� Brown had initially tried to arrange financ-
ing with the support of the Reich on his own 
in early 1932, but because of the high-risk 
nature of oil development the Minister of 
Economics advised him to seek additional 
partners while the government studied the 
issue more carefully; Warmbold to Brown, 29 
April 1932, R 2/16815, BA-B; Grobba, “Finan-
zierung des deutschen Anteils an der B�O�D�,” 
26 May 1932, R 92245, PAAA� Information 
about Brown is meager, but his activities in 
Iran during the 1920s are examined in Rashid 
Khatib-Shahidi, German Foreign Policy 
towards Iran before World War II: Political 
Relations, Economic Influence and the Bank of 
Persia (London: Tauris, 2012), pp� 47ff, 182�
 38� Mejcher, Die Politik und das Öl, pp� 108–17� 
The composition of the German consortium  
 is summarized in “Irak—Transaktion,” n�d� 
[ca� 1932], R 2/16815, BA-B� For a good sum-
mation of the state of affairs at the beginning 
of 1934, see Koehler, “Deutsche Beteiligung 
an der Oelkonzession westlich des Tigris im 
Irak,” 10 January 1934, R 3101/20320, BA-B� 
See also Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der 
Kriegsmarine, p� 35ff� 
 39� Besides the sources below, see Mejcher, Die 
Politik und das Öl, pp� 125–45�
 40� Hitler had announced his commitment to 
rearmament, conscription, and the “occupa-
tion of living space in the east” as well as 
its “ruthless Germanization” to the leaders 
of the German army and navy in February 
1933—barely a week after taking office; Thilo 
Summer2015Review.indb   113 4/21/15   1:50 PM
23
Toprani: “The Navy’s Success Speaks for Itself”?: The German Navy’s Indepe
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 1 1 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Vogelsang, “Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte 
der Reichswehr,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeit-
geschichte 2, no� 4 (1954), pp� 434–36� A few 
months later, the new government adopted 
an ambitious eight-year military spending 
program that would consume between 5 
and 10 percent of gross domestic product 
per annum; Tooze, Wages of Destruction, pp� 
53–55� The growth in the size of the navy was 
considerable—a fivefold rise in manpower 
(16,450 to 78,892) and twelvefold budgetary 
increase (187,000,000 RM to 2,389,000,000 
RM) between 1932 and 1939; MGFA, Build-
Up of German Aggression, pp� 456–57� 
 41� Bentz, “Geologische Begutachtung der Erdöl-
konzession der British Oil Development Cy� 
Ltd� Mosul (Iraq),” 18 June 1935, BGR 49074� 
 42� Mejcher, Die Politik und das Öl, p� 137�
 43� Minister of Economics, “Deutsche Beteili-
gung an der Oelkonzessionsgesellschaft im 
Irak,” 26 June 1935, R 92246, PAAA; Minister 
of Finance, “Deutsche Beteiligung an der 
Mossul Oil Fields Co Ltd,” 31 July 1935, 
R2/16816, BA-B� 
 44� For that reason, he was also a major backer 
of the German synthetic-fuel industry� For 
background on Schacht’s policies, see Tooze, 
Wages of Destruction, pp� 86–96, 115–20�
 45� Schacht to Krosigk, “Deutsche Beteiligung 
an der BOD,” 13 July 1935, R 92246, PAAA; 
Grobba to the Foreign Office, “Eisenbahn-
bau der B�O�D� von ihren Ölfeldern nach 
Tel-Kotchek,” 19 July 1935, T-77/645 (Wi/Vi� 
13a, b), NARA; Pelte to Krosigk, “Deutsche 
Beteiligung an der BOD,” 29 July 1935, R 
2/16816, BA-B; Nasse and Härtig, “Deutsche 
Beteiligung an der Ölgewinnung im Irak,” 
23 August 1935, R2/16816, BA-B; Schacht 
to Krosigk, “Deutsche Beteiligung an der 
B�O�D�,” 6 December 1935, R 92247, PAAA� 
See also Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der 
Kriegsmarine, pp� 36–38�
 46� Armed Forces Office, Defense-Economy 
Bureau, “Vortragsnotiz über Einfuhr von 
Iraköl,” 6 August 1935, T-77/645 (Wi/Vi� 13a, 
b), NARA�
 47� Nasse and Härtig, “Deutsche Beteiligung 
an der Ölgewinnung im Irak”; Minister of 
Finance, “Neuanträge der Ferrostaal,” 6 No-
vember 1935; both in R2/16816, BA-B�
 48� Krosigk to Schacht, “Deutsche Beteiligung an 
der BOD,” 14 December 1935, T-77/645 (Wi/
Vi� 13a, b), NARA� 
 49� Schniewind to Prüfer, Thomas, Fetzer, and 
Nasse, “Deutsche Beteiligung an der BOD,” 
10 December 1935, R 92247, PAAA� 
 50� One sticking point was whether Ferrostaal 
had sufficient funds to take over the BOD 
and pursue construction of both a railway 
and pipeline to the Mediterranean; Griebel, 
“Aktenvermerk über eine Besprechung im 
R�Wi�Min� am 16�12�1935,” 28 December 
1935, T-77/645 (Wi/Vi� 13a, b), NARA� A 
representative of Ferrostaal’s sister company 
assured the Armed Forces Office that neither 
the political nor the financial obstacles were 
insurmountable� Thomas to Reusch, 25 Sep-
tember 1935; Reusch to Thomas, 1 October 
1935; and Thomas to Reusch, 9 October 1935; 
all in T-77/645 (Wi/Vi� 13a, b), NARA� 
 51� Finance Ministry, “Deutsche Beteiligung an 
der Mosul Oil Fields: Besprechung in RWiM 
v� 23�9�36,” 24 September 1936, R2/16816, 
BA-B� Davis sweetened the deal by offering 
to provide oil from alternative sources on a 
clearing basis until production began in Iraq 
and to refine future imports of Iraqi oil in 
a refinery he owned in Hamburg, which he 
would sell to the German navy on a long-
term contract; Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung 
der Kriegsmarine, pp� 37–38� 
 52� Raeder to Krosigk, “Deutsche Beteiligung an 
der BOD,” 13 January 1936; “Ausführungen 
zu dem Projekt Mosul Oil Field Company,” 
enclosed with Raeder to Krosigk, “Deutsche 
Beteiligung an der BOD,” 29 January 1936, 
R 2/16816, BA-B; both reprinted in Mejcher, 
Die Politik und das Öl, pp� 235–46 (see also 
pp� 138–40, 142–43)� Trading shares of 
Iraqi oil for Latin American oil appears to 
have been the preference of Schacht as well; 
Ritter, “Aktenvermerk,” 3 December 1936, 
T-120/2433, NARA� 
 53� Raeder to Keitel et al�, “Ölversorgung der 
Kriegsmarine�” 
 54� No full record of the meeting exists� A minute 
to Krosigk makes no mention of Keppler’s 
position and only summarizes the navy’s 
position� Minute for Krosigk, 26 March 1936, 
R 2/16816, BA-B� 
 55� Keppler dismissed Raeder’s criticism, sur-
mising that the artless admiral had clearly 
Summer2015Review.indb   114 4/21/15   1:50 PM
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
 T O P R A N I  1 1 5
been led astray by someone who was “at the 
very least careless with the trust of others”; 
Kepp ler to Funk, 15 May 1940, enclosed with 
Funk to Raeder, 6 June 1940, T-77/211 (Wi/
IF 5�1082), NARA� See also Meier-Dörnberg, 
Ölversorgung der Kriegsmarine, p� 43 note 
120�
 56� Finance Ministry, “Irak-Oel-Konsortium”; 
Mejcher, Die Politik und das Öl, pp� 124–25� 
 57� The Finance Ministry was not convinced� 
Until a way could be found to move the oil 
via pipeline, the operating costs of the BOD 
would be exorbitant; anyway, too little oil 
could be transported to the Mediterranean 
for the company to be profitable; minute for 
Krosigk, “Irak Industriekonsortium: Deutsche 
Beteiligung an der BOD,” 31 January 1936, R 
2/16816, BA-B� The disagreements between 
the Naval High Command and the Finance 
Ministry are summarized in Raeder to  
Krosigk et al�, “Ölversorgung der Kriegs-
marine,” 27 June 1940, T-1022/3405 (PG 
31762/B), NARA� Schacht’s enthusiasm also 
began to wane, because of his mistrust for 
Davis� Finally, the legality of Ferrostaal’s 
plan was in question, owing to a lawsuit in 
London; Mejcher, Die Politik und das Öl, pp� 
143–45�
 58� Mejcher, Die Politik und das Öl, p� 143; 
Ruprecht, “Italien und das albanische Erdöl,” 
Militär-Wochenblatt 125, no� 33 (14 February 
1941)�
 59� Grobba to the Foreign Office, “Inhalt der Iraq 
Petroleum Company an der British Oil Devel-
opment Company,” 23 October 1936, en-
closed with Foreign Office to the Economics 
Ministry et al�, 30 October 1936, R 2/16816, 
BA-B, reprinted in Mejcher, Die Politik und 
das Öl, pp� 247–53; Grobba, Männer und 
Mächte, p� 94�
 60� Helmut Mejcher, “Die britische Erdölpoli-
tik im Nahen Osten, 1914–1956,” Viertel-
jahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsge-
schichte 59, no� 3 (1972), p� 368; Mejcher, 
Kampf der Mächte und Konzerne vor dem 
Zweiten Weltkrieg, p� 143; Meier-Dörnberg, 
Ölversorgung der Kriegsmarine, pp� 38–39; 
Zetzsche, “Logistik und Operationen,” pp� 
66–67� Unfortunately, the relevant volume 
of the history of BP deals with the BOD only 
superficially and does not mention the Sec-
ond Italo-Abyssinian War; James Bamberg, 
The History of the British Petroleum Company, 
vol� 2, The Anglo-Iranian Years, 1928–1954 
(Cambridge, U�K�: Cambridge Univ� Press, 
1994), pp� 162–70�
 61� Mejcher, Die Politik und das Öl, p� 145� 
 62� Jäger, “Memorandum über die Mosul Oil 
Fields Ltd�” See also Bamberg, Anglo-Iranian 
Years, p� 170, and A� E� Gunther, “The Ger-
man War for Crude Oil,” Petroleum Times (27 
March 1948), pp� 319–20� 
 63� The German government tried to convince 
Ferrostaal either to maintain a minority 
interest or to sell its stake to another group 
of German firms� But the suicide of Thomas 
Brown (who had handled negotiations with 
the other partners in the BOD) and Ferro-
staal’s lack of interest in the oil business ruled 
out further German participation� Finance 
Ministry, “Deutsche Beteiligung an der Mosul 
Oil Fields,” 24 September 1936�
 64� The Economics Ministry had agreed to this 
concession in a letter to the Naval High Com-
mand of 22 March 1937, which is referenced 
in Raeder to Göring, “Erwerb von Erdöl-
konzessionen in Mexiko,” 9 September 1938, 
T-77/418 (Wi/IF 5�3326), NARA�
 65� The German minister to Mexico blanched at 
the thought of provoking the United States in 
such a manner and quickly declined the offer; 
A� A� Fursenko, The Battle for Oil: The Eco-
nomics and Politics of International Corporate 
Conflict over Petroleum (Greenwich, Conn�: 
JAI, 1990), pp� 149, 156–57; Friedrich Katz, 
The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United 
States, and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: 
Univ� of Chicago Press, 1981), pp� 203–205, 
240–43� The Deutsche Bank’s corporate strat-
egy between 1906 and 1912 is summarized in 
Nowell, Mercantile States and the World Oil 
Cartel, pp� 61–72� Nowell does not mention 
the role of Mexico; in his account, the still-
undiscovered oil fields of Mesopotamia  
(Iraq) would be the instrument by which Ger-
many freed itself from dependence on U�S�- 
controlled oil�
 66� “Besprechung über die Frage des Erwerbs von 
Erdölkonzessionen in Süd- und Mittelameri-
ka am 14� April 1937,” BGR 49022; German 
Foreign Office to the German Legation in 
Mexico, 25 May 1937, quoted in Volland, Das 
Dritte Reich und Mexiko, pp� 89–90� 
Summer2015Review.indb   115 4/21/15   1:50 PM
25
Toprani: “The Navy’s Success Speaks for Itself”?: The German Navy’s Indepe
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 1 1 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 67� Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der Kriegsma-
rine, p� 32�
 68� Weissmüller to Burandt, “Petroleum Conces-
sion in Mexico,” 26 September 1936, enclosed 
with Fetzer to the Foreign Ministry, “Petro-
leum Concession in Mexico,” 21 October 
1936, document no� 619, in Auswärtiges 
Amt, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 
1918–1945, Series C (Washington, D�C�: GPO, 
1957–1983), vol� 5, pp� 1130–32� 
 69� Volland, Das Dritte Reich und Mexiko, pp� 
86–99� Relations had cooled between the two 
countries between 1936 and 1938 over the 
Spanish Civil War and Mexican criticism of 
Germany’s aggressive foreign policy� Ibid�, pp� 
43–82�
 70� Besides the sources cited below, the following 
discussion is drawn from ibid�, pp� 103–54�
 71� Clayton Koppes, “The Good Neighbor Policy 
and the Nationalization of Mexican Oil: A 
Reinterpretation,” Journal of American History 
69, no� 1 (1982), pp� 62–81; Lorenzo Meyer, 
“The Expropriation and Great Britain,” in The 
Mexican Petroleum Industry in the Twenti-
eth Century, ed� Jonathan Brown and Allan 
Knight (Austin: Univ� of Texas Press, 1992), 
pp� 154–72; Volland, Das Dritte Reich und 
Mexiko, pp� 116–22� 
 72� Raeder to Göring, “Erwerb von Erdölkon-
zessionen in Mexiko”; Raeder to Keitel et al�, 
“Ölversorgung der Kriegsmarine�” For the 
role of the Dresdner Bank, see Christopher 
Simpson, ed�, War Crimes of the Deutsche 
Bank and the Dresdner Bank: Office of the 
Military Government (U.S.) Reports (New 
York: Holmes & Meier, 2002), pp� 284–87�
 73� Raeder to Keitel et al�, “Ölversorgung der 
Kriegsmarine�” 
 74� Volland, Das Dritte Reich und Mexiko, p� 104�
 75� Funk, “Stellungnahme � � � ,” 6 June 1940, 
enclosed with Funk to Raeder, 6 June 1940 
[emphasis original]� 
 76� Armed Forces High Command, Defense-
Economy Staff, “Aktennotiz auf Grund einer 
Besprechung mit Herrn Ministerialrat Dr� 
Fetzer OKM betr� Oelversorgung”; Volland, 
Das Dritte Reich und Mexiko, pp� 104–105, 
131–32� 
 77� The companies had apparently been “com-
plaining” about the navy’s concession 
  hunting� Raeder to Keitel et al�, “Ölversor-
gung der Kriegsmarine�”
 78� The German navy had declined an unde-
veloped oil concession held by Otto Wolff 
AG in Ecuador, precisely because it was 
only interested in oil fields near the Atlantic 
coast and considered it “uneconomical” to 
transport oil from the Pacific coast since it 
would have to travel through the Panama 
Canal; “Besprechung am 12� November 1937 
über Erdölkonzession der Firma Otto Wolff 
in Ecuador,” 18 November 1937, BGR 49022� 
For further details, see Eichholtz and Kockel, 
Von Krieg zu Krieg, pp� 171–79�
 79� Bentz was enamored of the prospects around 
Poza Rica and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec� 
He ruled out territories along the “Golden 
Lane” in Veracruz, where starting in 1908 
prospectors had discovered massive oil fields 
that were now nearing exhaustion, as well as 
more risky territories under state control that 
would require extensive investment in terms 
of exploration or infrastructure develop-
ment; “Bericht ueber die Moeglichkeiten von 
Erdoelbeteiligungen in Mexiko,” 30 October 
1936, BGR 49035; “Bericht über den Stand 
der Verhandlungen über Ölmöglichkeiten 
in Mexiko,” 10 November 1937, BGR 49038; 
“Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten an mexikanisch-
en Ölfeldern (Reise September/Oktober 
1937),” 15 January 1938, BGR 49044� Bentz 
also agreed to serve as the navy’s representa-
tive in negotiations with the Mexican govern-
ment; Naval High Command to Göring, 
“Erwerb von Erdölkonzessionen in Mexico,” 
28 November 1938, enclosed with Naval High 
Command to the Armed Forces Command, 
“Erwerb von Erdölkonzessionen in Mexiko,” 
28 November 1938, T-77/671 (Wi/VI� 236), 
NARA� 
 80� Raeder to Göring, “Erwerb von Erdölkon-
zessionen in Mexiko”; Raeder to Göring,  
“Erwerb von Erdölkonzessionen in Mexico 
[sic],” 12 December 1938, T-77/645 (Wi/Vi� 
13a, b), NARA� See also Armed Forces High 
Command, Defense-Economy Staff, “Akten-
notiz auf Grund einer Besprechung mit Herrn 
Ministerialrat Dr� Fetzer OKM betr� Oelver-
sorgung”; and Raeder to Keitel et al�, “Ölver-
sorgung der Kriegsmarine�” Until the summer 
of 1938, the German navy’s wartime planning 
focused primarily on the demands of waging 
a conflict against France or the Soviet Union;
Summer2015Review.indb   116 4/21/15   1:50 PM
26
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
 T O P R A N I  1 1 7
   Salewski, Deutsche Seekriegsleitung, pp� 20– 
38� Even after war against Britain became 
likely, the navy continued to hope that Latin 
America could serve as a staging area; Meier-
Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der Kriegsmarine, pp� 
44–48� That the German navy might continue 
to purchase supplies of oil from overseas in 
wartime was not out of the question if it could 
do so through Italy� In fact, as of November 
1939, the navy still had fifty thousand tons of 
diesel stored abroad, primarily in Spain and 
the Soviet Union� Moreover, the navy hoped 
to purchase oil from Mexico or the United 
States using surreptitious dollar reserves in 
Switzerland and New York ($476,200, plus an 
additional $711,300 stored at home); attach-
ment to Grassman to the Naval Warfare Staff, 
6 December 1939, T-1022/1735 (PG 32198a), 
NARA�
 81� Funk to the Naval High Command, 5 De-
cember 1938; Naval High Command to Funk, 
“Ölbezüge aus Mexiko � � � ,” 27 December 
1938; attachments 1, 2 to Raeder to Funk et 
al�, 27 June 1940� See also Meier-Dörnberg, 
Ölversorgung der Kriegsmarine, pp� 41–42�
 82� The Naval High Command did not help 
its case by refusing to coordinate with the 
Armed Forces High Command: Raw Materi-
als Department to Defense-Economy Staff, 
“Erwerb von Erdölkonzessionen in Mexiko 
durch OKM,” 27 September 1938; Armed 
Forces High Command, Defense-Economy 
Staff, “Devisenantrag OKM für Ölkonzes-
sionen in Mexiko,” 30 September 1938; both 
in T-77/671 (Wi/VI� 236), NARA� In spite of 
the navy’s behavior, the Armed Forces High 
Command considered the proposal to be 
“desirable” and supported the expenditure of 
£600,000; Keitel, “Erwerb von Erdölkonzes-
sionen in Mexiko,” 5 October 1938, T-77/671 
(Wi/VI� 236), NARA� The navy’s secretiveness 
over its intentions—such as plans to refine 
Mexican oil in a refinery on the Spanish 
Canary Islands or to stockpile fuel abroad in 
secret depots—contributed to other agencies’ 
mistrust; Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der 
Kriegsmarine, p� 40; Zetzsche, “Logistik und 
Operationen,” p� 61�
 83� Davis had been promoting closer economic 
relations between Mexico and the Third 
Reich since 1934 and had arranged for a geo-
logical mission to Mexico under Bentz’s lead-
ership in 1936; Clemm to das Auswaertige 
Amt, “W� R� Davis, Boston,” 16 April 1936, 
R 92247, PAAA� For more on Davis’s early 
efforts, which succeeded in garnering the 
official German support for the construction 
of a refinery in Hamburg to process imported 
oil from Mexico, see Volland, Das Dritte Reich 
und Mexiko, pp� 83–86� According to the U�S� 
State Department, Davis and the German 
navy had agreed to the sale of 300,000 tons 
of Mexican oil, with payment split sixty/forty 
between “Askimarks” and foreign exchange; 
U�S� Consulate, Bremen, to the secretary of 
state, “The German Oil Industry,” 5 Sep-
tember 1938, no� 133, Record Group 59, 
General Records of the Department of State, 
862�6363/183, NARA� 
 84� Not everyone in Germany trusted Davis—the 
Finance Ministry and Schacht did not want 
him to play any role in Iraq through the BOD; 
minute by the Finance Ministry, 26 March 
1936, R2/16816, BA-B� German intelligence 
had its own doubts about Davis, claiming 
that his company’s “interests now turn more 
towards the French Government than the 
German”; Reich Main Security Office to 
Keppler, “Firma Davis u� Co�, New York,” 11 
September 1939, T-120/2677, NARA� Davis 
died suddenly of a heart attack in Houston 
in August 1941, possibly assassinated by 
British intelligence; William Stevenson, A 
Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp� 
289–95� For more on Davis’s colorful history, 
see Dale Harrington, Mystery Man: William 
Rhodes Davis, Nazi Agent of Influence (Lon-
don: Brassey’s, 2001)� 
 85� Volland, Das Dritte Reich und Mexiko, pp� 
133–36; Zetzsche, “Logistik und Operati-
onen,” pp� 73–80� According to the Eco-
nomics Ministry, Shell and Standard had 
requested only a “restriction” of the oil trade 
with Mexico� Economics Minister Walther 
Funk complained that the navy had misrep-
resented the oil companies’ offer as a demand 
for the complete cessation of all oil sales with 
Mexico� Funk, “Stellungnahme� � � �”
 86� Raeder to Keitel et al�, “Ölversorgung der 
Kriegsmarine”; Volland, Das Dritte Reich und 
Mexiko, p� 139� 
 87� Funk, “Stellungnahme� � � �”
 88� Volland, Das Dritte Reich und Mexiko, pp� 
156–74, 199–200�
Summer2015Review.indb   117 4/21/15   1:50 PM
27
Toprani: “The Navy’s Success Speaks for Itself”?: The German Navy’s Indepe
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 1 1 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 89� Ibid�, pp� 121, 139–40, 154–56� The Germans 
never followed through on their end of the 
barter exchange (delivery of oil tankers); 
Gunther, “German War for Crude Oil,” p� 319�
 90� Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der Kriegs-
marine, p� 41 note 111; British Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, Technical Sub-Committee on 
Axis Oil, Oil as a Factor in the German War 
Effort, 1933–1945, 8 March 1946, A�O� (46) 
1, p� 84, retrieved from the Digital Library of 
the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kans�
 91� Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der Kriegsma-
rine, p� 30�
 92� Raeder to Funk et al�, 27 June 1940; Meier-
Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der Kriegsmarine, 
pp� 43–44; Raeder, Mein Leben, pp� 63–64; 
Zetzsche, “Logistik und Operationen,” pp� 
56–57� Funk was so infuriated by Raeder’s 
note of 27 June 1940 that he refused to dis-
cuss the matter any further; Funk to Raeder, 
11 July 1940, T-77/211 (Wi/IF 5�1082), 
NARA� 
 93� Raeder, Mein Leben, p� 63�
 94� USSBS, Oil in Japan’s War (Washington, 
D�C�: GPO, 1946), pp� 11–16; Jack Greene 
and Alessandro Massignani, The Naval War 
in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943 (London: 
Chatham, 1998), pp� 142–44� The Italians 
imported 1,303,328 tons of petroleum from 
Germany and Romania between 1940 and 
1943, but even this did not suffice to maintain 
the Italian navy at a state of full operational 
readiness�
 95� USSBS, Oil Division, p� 17�
 96� The fuel oil situation would deteriorate 
considerably in the event of new naval 
construction and thereafter depend on the 
security of existing synthetic facilities, further 
expansion of synthetic output, and continued 
imports from overland suppliers� Attachment 
to Grassman to the Naval Warfare Staff, 6 
December 1939�
 97� Chiefs of Staff Committee, Oil as a Factor in 
the German War Effort, p� 84� 
 98� See Robert Goralski and Russell Freeburg, 
Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel 
in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat (New York: 
Morrow, 1987), pp� 13–26, which was one of 
the primary sources for Daniel Yergin, The 
Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and 
Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 
pp� 328–50� 
 99� Meier-Dörnberg, Ölversorgung der Kriegsma-
rine, p� 43�
 100� See Anand Toprani, “Germany’s Answer to 
Standard Oil: The Continental Oil Company 
and Nazi Grand Strategy, 1940–1942,” Journal 
of Strategic Studies 37, nos� 6–7 (December 
2014), pp� 949–73�
 101� Much of the navy’s ineffectiveness stemmed 
from its leadership’s disparagement of naval 
aviation and submarines in favor of surface 
ships before the war� Murray, Change in the 
European Balance of Power, pp� 45–47�
 102� USSBS, German Oil Industry, p� 23� 
 103� MGFA, Build-Up of German Aggression, pp� 
457–58� 
 104� Williamson Murray, “The Luftwaffe before 
the Second World War: A Mission, a Strat-
egy?,” Journal of Strategic Studies 4, no� 3 
(1981), pp� 261–70, esp� 268�
Summer2015Review.indb   118 4/21/15   1:50 PM
28
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
 
 
“Overview Map of the Mexican Oil Fields,” BGR 49044. 
 
  
29
Toprani: “The Navy’s Success Speaks for Itself”?: The German Navy’s Indepe
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 
 
“Crude Oil in the Orient,” 30 January 1939, BGR 49062. 
  
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
 
 
“Geological Evaluation of the Crude Oil Concession of the British Oil Development Company, Ltd., 
Mosul (Iraq),” 18 June 1935, BGR 49074. 
 
  
31
Toprani: “The Navy’s Success Speaks for Itself”?: The German Navy’s Indepe
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
 
 
“Crude Oil Concessions,” BGR 49459. 
32
Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
